Is today’s world “bipolar” with China and the United States as the poles? Observers from various countries have different views. In fairness, compared with the “bipolar world” during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, it is inaccurate to characterize today’s world as a “bipolar world” in the throes of a “new Cold War”. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had many military allies. They had few economic, financial, trade, social and cultural ties with each other. The ideological struggle and confrontation between them was sharp and severe. Not many countries were outside the two camps, and the “proxy wars” between them in other parts of the world were ubiquitous.
Today, the relationship between China and the US differs visibly. In the US “pole”, there are various military alliances, with NATO as the backbone and other alliances between the US and Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. However China has not acquired any military allies. The financial, trade, social and cultural ties between China and the US are very close. Although the US persists in describing the ideological conflict between China and the US as that of “democracy vs autocracy”, compared with the struggle between “capitalism” and “socialism” in the past, the conflict between “democracy” and “autocracy” is much less intense in depth and breadth. Most countries do not belong to the US or the China “pole”. Instead, they maintain contact with China and the US and are reluctant to forge alliances. Moreover, no proxy war exists (yet) between the US and China.
Realistically, the term “quasi-bipolar world” is seemingly more helpful to make sense of the current situation. In the “quasi-bipolar world”, the US “pole” is a political and military bloc that comprises the NATO and Asian military allies of the US. The number of countries involved, however, is not many. Recently, the US has been actively wooing some of China’s neighbors, such as India and Vietnam, but the results have not been impressive. Although the US has used the Russia-Ukraine conflict to briefly strengthen its relations with its military allies, they lack consensus on many significant issues. The US’ unilateral actions, such as protectionism, tariff policies, currency policies, industrial policies and subsidy policies, have often hurt or sacrificed the interests of its allies. More importantly, apart from providing (far from ironclad) “security guarantees”, the US can only provide minimal or no economic benefits to its allies.
While US policy is antagonistic and the US tries strenuously to contain China, most US allies, particularly Germany, France and Hungary, want to maintain close economic and trade relations with China. They are apprehensive about getting enmeshed in a US-China war over Taiwan. Therefore, although the US often boasts that it can rely on a powerful military bloc to deal with China, this “bloc” will prove disunited and unreliable. In recent years, some US allies have been trying to reduce their security dependence on the US and strive for greater strategic autonomy.
In the China “pole”, the situation is entirely dissimilar. Unlike the US, China has forged strategic partnerships with many countries, mainly to promote cooperation in economy, trade, culture and infrastructure, but has refrained from forming military alliances with any country. The major battlefields between China and the US are economy, technology, culture and diplomacy. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, China has forged many strategic partnerships with various countries around the world. By acting as a mediator between conflicting countries, supporting the work of the United Nations, providing generous foreign aid, and participating in overseas infrastructural construction, China has won the gratitude of a large number of developing countries. As the “world’s factory”, the world’s largest trading nation, and a significant source of direct investment, China has closer economic ties with countries worldwide than the US.
In the future, China’s friends and partners in the “Global South” will continue to increase. As the membership of the SCO and BRICS continues to expand, their economic aggregates will increasingly surpass that of the US-dominated Group of Seven (G7). This means that in the “anti-containment” struggle with the US, China will gain more and more capabilities and clout in the economic and diplomatic domains. The global influence of the China “pole”, especially in the “Global South”, will eventually surpass the US “pole”.
In these circumstances, Hong Kong, as an international financial, business, shipping, service and information hub, is well-positioned to play an intermediary and bridge role, linking the China “pole” with the US “pole” and attracting capital from Western enterprises and talents to use Hong Kong as a channel to enter the economic and trade network of the China “pole” and establish closer economic and trade relations with countries in the “Global South”
In today’s “quasi-bipolar world”, although the US continues to step up its containment of China, the US and its allies are still very close to China regarding economy, trade and finance. Ian Bremmer, the American political scientist, points out that the US and China are locked in an intensifying geopolitical competition that has led them to decouple in areas perceived to be of national security importance. These areas encompass an ever-growing number of “strategic sectors” from dual-use technologies such as semiconductors to renewable energy to social media and other information industries. But this partial decoupling can only go so far because the US and Chinese economies are so interdependent that a complete divorce would ruin both countries and the rest of the world too.
What is even more remarkable is that most countries, mainly those in the “Global South”, and especially those increasingly powerful ones such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, are not willing to join either the US “pole” or the China “pole”. While a member of NATO, Türkiye can only be described as an aberrant member of the US “pole”. Countries in the “Global South” strive to maintain their strategic autonomy and political neutrality from the perspective of “seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages”. They are committed to safeguarding and promoting their own interests by establishing primarily “transactional relationships” with China and the US. Since these countries have changeable relations with the US and China, they have become China’s and the US’ wooing targets. At present and in the future, China and the US will engage in a fierce battle to win over countries in the “Global South”. In the long run, China will have more advantages than the US in this endeavor. Historically, most countries in the “Global South” have been ravaged by Western imperialism, colonialism and unfair trade, just like China. White racism, past and present, is a stumbling block preventing the West from forging emotional bonds with the “Global South”. It’s thus relatively more straightforward for China to establish empathy, mutual respect and trust with the “Global South”. Over the past few decades, the bullying and self-seeking behavior of the US and the West has wholly exposed their hypocrisy and brutality, which are abominations to the “Global South”. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the US took advantage of its brief “unipolar moment” to wantonly invade other countries, instigate “color revolutions”, drive “regime change” across the world, and force other countries to adopt Western values, systems and development models, bringing about woes and devastation to many countries. In recent years, the status of “democracy”, “freedom” and “human rights” in the West, as well as the prospects of the Western world, have been questioned and deplored by the “Global South”. The development opportunities and assistance the West can provide to the “Global South” are meager and come with unbearable conditions.
The political commentator Fareed Zakaria rightly argues that the Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted a broader phenomenon: Many of the largest and most powerful countries in the developing world are growing increasingly anti-Western and anti-American. These countries have also become more nationalist, and their nationalism is often defined in opposition to the countries that dominate the international system, meaning the West. Therefore, they retain an instinctive aversion to Western efforts to corral them into an alliance or grouping.
In contrast, China’s development model, experience, achievements and generosity are increasingly attractive to the “Global South”. China is more willing to share development achievements and benefits with the “Global South” than the West. Consequently, China is poised to harvest increasing recognition and support in the “Global South”. The China “pole” also will have increasing resources, investment opportunities and development opportunities to offer than the US “pole”.
Mark Leonard, a British political scientist, explains: “Although China and the US agree that the post-Cold War order is over, they are betting on very different successors. In Washington, the return of great-power competition requires revamping the alliances and institutions at the heart of the post-World War II order that helped the US win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. This updated global order is meant to incorporate much of the world, leaving China and several of its most important partners — including Iran, North Korea and Russia — isolated outside. But Beijing is confident that Washington’s efforts will prove futile. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, other countries’ search for sovereignty and identity is incompatible with the formation of Cold War-style blocs. It will instead result in a more fragmented, multipolar world in which China can take its place as a great power.”
For Hong Kong, while the US and the West will continue to contain, smear and hurt Hong Kong unscrupulously, the “quasi-bipolar world” will be a crucial source of opportunity, enabling it to compensate for the losses from the West. Still, given the US and the West’s enormous economic, trade and financial interests in Hong Kong, the US and the West will maintain close economic relations and cooperation with Hong Kong in the short to medium term, though weakening continuously. In the long run, with the irreversible rise of China and other major developing countries, the economic volume and development prospects of the economic and trade network within the China “pole” will surpass those of the US “pole”. American and Western companies and talents will be attracted by the opportunities provided by the economic and trade network of the China “pole”. In these circumstances, Hong Kong, as an international financial, business, shipping, service and information hub, is well-positioned to play an intermediary and bridge role, linking the China “pole” with the US “pole” and attracting capital from Western enterprises and talents to use Hong Kong as a channel to enter the economic and trade network of the China “pole” and establish closer economic and trade relations with countries in the “Global South”. Of course, to better grasp the new development opportunities brought about by the “quasi-bipolar world”, Hong Kong must work hard with the country to strengthen and consolidate various ties and cooperation with countries in the “Global South” by capitalizing on the unique advantages of Hong Kong conferred by “one country, two systems”.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant for the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.