At a meeting on Monday the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency set up a formal agenda item on the transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS on the proposal of China.
This is the third time the nuclear submarine issue has been included in the IAEA's agenda since the United States and the United Kingdom announced they would transfer nuclear submarine technology "to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia" under the trilateral security pact.
The short announcement the three countries issued on their cooperation last year was like a thief throwing a stone over a wall to see if there are watchdogs before sneaking into a courtyard.
They hypocritically claimed that the purpose of the deal was to strengthen "both the nuclear non-proliferation regime and Australia's exemplary non-proliferation credentials", knowing that, to the contrary, they are setting a dangerous precedent for a non-nuclear state to acquire the materials and technologies necessary to transform it into a nuclear power.
If the transfer goes ahead as planned, Australia could use the naval reactor program as cover for the development of nuclear weapons as it will become the first country without nuclear weapons to exploit a loophole in the non-proliferation regime that will allow it to remove its nuclear materials from the inspection system of the IAEA.
The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon states to declare all their nuclear materials and tasks with the IAEA verifying that none of this material is used to build nuclear weapons. The NPT does not prohibit non-nuclear-weapon states from building or operating nuclear-powered vessels, however. This is the loophole that the three countries are exploiting. In doing so, they are setting a bad precedent that goes against the spirit of the NPT, and which will likely encourage other countries to follow suit.
Brazil has already initiated discussions with the IAEA, aimed at clearing the way for it to use nuclear fuel in a submarine for the first time.
That said, nuclear capabilities may also become a reward for joining the anti-China club the US is setting up, irrespective of the implications for nuclear non-proliferation.
The nuclear weapons' materials and technologies involved in the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation should not be kept outside the IAEA inspection system. The US, the UK and Australia must fulfill their obligations under the treaty and immediately and comprehensively report to the IAEA all relevant information on the transfer, despite the US trying to put the transfer outside the remit of the NPT by claiming it is for "non-explosive military use".
The IAEA on its part must ensure that the deal does not undermine the international non-proliferation regime.