On June 8, 2020, Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, in an online speech to a seminar to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the Basic Law, made an extraordinary statement on the factors hampering the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” since 1997. He pointedly averred that the principal had little to do with the sluggish economy, shortage of housing for the grassroots people, unemployment, the ossification of class interests, and the hurdles to upward mobility of the young people. Instead, the paramount factor, Zhang declared, was the political problem.
The gist of the political problem specifically was the intransigent and bellicose political opposition, which deliberately distorted the meaning of “one country, two systems”, blatantly undermined Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability, unscrupulously sowed divisions and discord in society, strenuously strived to turn Hong Kong into “an independent political entity”, and deliberately tried to convert Hong Kong into a base of subversion against the Communist Party of China.
We shall expect Beijing to take substantive actions to promote Hong Kong’s economic development, improve Hong Kong’s people’s livelihoods, and advance social fairness and justice in Hong Kong in the days ahead
This remark by Zhang is of utmost importance in making sense of Beijing’s new policy toward Hong Kong since this was the first time Beijing formally acknowledged that the principal problem hobbling the implementation of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong is the obstruction and sabotage of the political opposition that has long been patronized by external antagonistic forces, the United States and secessionists in Taiwan being the main culprits. The fact that Beijing only makes such an acknowledgment more than 20 years after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should not be interpreted as Beijing misreading Hong Kong’s situation and misdiagnosing Hong Kong’s problems all along. Such an interpretation is simply beyond credulity, as the messages I received privately from many Beijing officials suggest otherwise. From Beijing’s point of view, its proclaimed policy toward Hong Kong must be consistent with its announced definition of Hong Kong’s situation. If Beijing explicitly admits that the political problem is the paramount issue, it must tackle the focus of Beijing’s Hong Kong policy, which should then be to directly appease, restrain, do battle with or suppress the local opposition and its foreign patrons. However, for a variety of reasons, for a long time, Beijing was not ready to counter the internal and external antagonistic forces head-on.
For one thing, Beijing placed primary emphasis on maintaining Hong Kong’s stability and the confidence of the Hong Kong people in Hong Kong’s future. Beijing avoided taking on the local opposition for fear of generating “unnecessary” political turmoil in Hong Kong, of weakening the confidence of the Hong Kong people in Beijing’s promises, and of being excoriated by the West for infringing upon Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. What might be more pertinent is that Beijing still harbored some goodwill or illusion toward the local opposition, hoping against hope that eventually the recalcitrant opposition would change its mind, face reality, and adopt a more-cooperative political stance. In any case, Beijing understood that to effectively resolve the political problem, large-scale political engineering was called for, and many uncertain political losses and consequences had to be sustained. Even though the political situation of the HKSAR was not desirable, it, however, was still deemed as minimally acceptable. Consequently, Beijing saw no alternative but to allow the suboptimal situation to linger on, hoping that it would not worsen and would even gradually improve.
Therefore, to tackle the political problem engendered by the internal and external antagonistic forces, Beijing initially attempted primarily indirect and nonpolitical means. Beijing reckoned that the opposition was able to thrive because it could adroitly and brazenly exploit the deep-seated and longstanding public grievances over the economic, social and livelihood issues in Hong Kong. Accordingly, Beijing tried to detract public support from the opposition by putting forward policies that would ameliorate public discontent and foster public support for the beleaguered HKSAR government. Most of these policies were designed to promote economic development and enhance people’s livelihoods in Hong Kong. This line of reasoning was amply reflected in policy initiatives such as the CEPA free trade agreement with the mainland, the Individual Visit Scheme, building Hong Kong up as a prime offshore renminbi financial center, and encouraging Chinese mainland enterprises to invest in Hong Kong and list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. To a certain extent, these policy initiatives, which forged closer economic ties between Hong Kong and the mainland, did benefit Hong Kong as a whole, but the distribution of the benefits coming from it among different social sectors however was somewhat unequal. While the big corporations with substantial linkages with the mainland harvested most of the benefits, many people from the working and middle classes however considered themselves as the losers as they were at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis many mainlanders or as they felt that their way of life, as well as interests, was upended by the “influx” of mainland compatriots. The public discontent thus generated provided fertile soil for the rise of “nativism” and “secessionism” in Hong Kong, leading to the rapid radicalization of the political opposition as well as the rise of violence in local politics.
Most importantly, since the turn of the century, the United States and its loyal allies have increasingly seen the rise of China as an “existential” threat and pursued a militant policy of containment against China. From the perspective of the “pro-independence” Taiwan authorities, a Hong Kong mired in turmoil would diminish the appeal of “one country, two systems” to Taiwan residents. Ominously, Hong Kong is seen by the external antagonist forces as a useful “weapon” in undermining China’s security. In this new international context, collusion between the radical opposition of Hong Kong and the Western forces has stepped up. The large-scale insurrection that erupted in 2019-20 was the product of an increasingly collusive relationship between the local opposition and external antagonistic forces.
Not surprisingly, the past decade or so had seen Beijing increasingly disappointed and disillusioned with the effectiveness of nonpolitical measures to tackle Hong Kong’s political problems. In giving up hope that the radical opposition will relent anytime soon and being warier and warier of external security threats, Beijing started to adopt political means to cope with the increasingly grave political challenges. Previously, compared with nonpolitical means, the political measures adopted by Beijing were mild measures to support the “patriots” in the Legislative Council and District Council elections. During the decade-long turmoil in Hong Kong in the 2010s, Beijing had increasingly resorted to political means to end the chaos and restore order in Hong Kong. Beijing’s multipronged political strategy consists of several major interrelated parts. The most important component is the neutering of the radical opposition and their external patrons by ousting them from Hong Kong’s Election Committee, and the chief executive and Legislative Council elections, and thus from Hong Kong’s governance. This has been achieved by drastically revamping the electoral system of the HKSAR. Second, the political space of maneuver of the antagonistic forces is to be drastically squeezed through the National Security Law for Hong Kong. Third, the revamped electoral system is to make sure that both the Legislative Council and the HKSAR government are dominated by patriots, and that a more cooperative executive-legislative relationship is forged. Fourth, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will take a more proactive approach in interpreting the Basic Law to make sure that all three branches of the political system of Hong Kong, especially the judiciary, will not derail the implementation of “one country, two systems” through misinterpreting the Basic Law inadvertently or willfully. This means that Beijing will dispel previous scruples about interpreting the Basic Law and instead make it a “normal” or “ordinary” affair. Fifth, Beijing will closely supervise the HKSAR government, monitor its performance, issue instructions and orders when necessary, and hold it accountable for failures and malfeasance. This will make sure that Beijing and the HKSAR government will take concerted actions in coping with the major internal and external political challenges of Hong Kong. Concomitantly, Beijing will strongly bolster the authority of the HKSAR government and its capability to administer Hong Kong. Sixth, Beijing will embark on an enormous and long-term political project of enlarging, unifying, and strengthening the patriotic camp of Hong Kong to realize fully the principle of “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong”. This involves setting up the necessary institutions to identify, groom, support, reward and deploy patriotic political talent. Seventh, policies and measures will be adopted to ensure that the civil servants are fully apprised of the purposes and principles of “one country, two systems”, are loyal to the HKSAR and the nation, and will faithfully execute the orders and policies of the government. Finally, a large-scale and ambitious program of national education, education on the Chinese Constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law, historical education, and national security education will be launched in the schools and society to ensure that Hong Kong residents, the young people in particular, will become “patriots” and no longer be “brainwashed” by the anti-China forces.
As the belated emphasis on using the political strategy to make sure that “one country, two systems” is comprehensively and accurately implemented in Hong Kong entails a large number of long-term political projects, this strategy is expected to continue into the long-term future. The success of the political strategy will allow “one country, two systems” to remain well beyond 2047. Nonetheless, nonpolitical means will continue to complement and support the political strategy. And that is why we shall expect Beijing to take substantive actions to promote Hong Kong’s economic development, improve Hong Kong’s people’s livelihoods, and advance social fairness and justice in Hong Kong in the days ahead.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.