On May 2, 2023, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government announced major reforms to the formation methods and functions of district councils.
Over the past few years, the methods for forming the electoral committee, electing the chief executive as well as the Legislative Council, have all undergone fundamental reforms. This time, the method for forming district councils generally follows the basic principles of the three preceding reforms. Although district councils are not political institutions, they still occupy a crucial position in Hong Kong’s governance structure and are poised to become increasingly important in the future. After the reform, the revamping of Hong Kong’s governance structure is basically complete, which means that Hong Kong’s governance system and its performance are expected to be significantly enhanced in the future. It also has immense practical significance for the comprehensive and accurate practice of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong and the long-term prosperity and stability of the city.
From the legislative intent of the Basic Law, the district council, as a regional organization, is essentially an advisory body that assists the administrative organ in its governance, a quasi-administrative body, and a means of realizing the principle of “executive-led government”. The function of the district councils should be to assist and cooperate with the HKSAR government to improve administrative management at the district level and to be an important partner in improving the quality of life of the residents in the districts. However, since the return of Hong Kong to the motherland, the operation of district councils has always deviated from the provisions of the Basic Law. Over time, the district council has increasingly become a political institution that confronts the HKSAR government, a political platform for partisan struggle, an active venue for “Hong Kong independence” agitators, and a channel for external forces to intervene in Hong Kong affairs. The district councils formed in 2019 are almost completely controlled by various “anti-China and seditionist elements”, turning them into a means to try to paralyze the administration of the HKSAR government, stir up political unrest, and seize the regime of the city.
The core goal of this profound reform of the method for forming the district councils and their functions is to “restore order from chaos”, conform their operation with the original intention of the Basic Law, and enable the entire governance structure of Hong Kong to render effective and high-quality governance in the city, especially at the district level. Specifically, this reform is expected to implement several important principles and achieve several important goals.
First, the reform allows “patriots” to fully dominate the district councils. Forty percent of the district councilors who will be appointed by the HKSAR government must be qualified “patriots”. Another 40 percent elected by patriotic groups in the district committee sector should also be “patriots”. Due to the adoption of the “dual-seat, single-vote” electoral system, some of the remaining 20 percent of district councilors elected by districts are expected to be the so-called “pan-democrats”, but I believe that these people should be willing to conform to the minimal requirements of a “patriot” or it will be difficult for them to obtain the approval of the screening body to become candidates in the district council elections. For this reason, they can also be classified as “patriots”.
Second, the reform will open a broader space for the development of the “patriotic forces”. Since only “patriots” have the qualifications and opportunities to participate in the work of the district councils, it is estimated that in the future, more “patriots” will actively take part in the district council elections and regard it as a means to develop their political career, hone their political and administrative skills, cultivate ties with the masses, and familiarize themselves with the work of the government. In addition, since patriotic district groups can elect their representatives to the district councils through indirect elections and serve as nominators of candidates, their political status and functions will also rise, thereby attracting more talents to join and contribute to these groups.
Third, the continuous development of patriotic district groups and the nomination of patriotic district councilors who can connect local people with district councils through direct elections will further strengthen the linkage between the “patriotic forces” and the constituent residents, thus further expanding the political clout of the “patriotic camp”. The mass base of the “patriotic forces” will be broadened and their ability to organize and mobilize district residents will be enhanced. This will increase the legitimacy of the arrangement of “patriots governing Hong Kong” and raise public trust and confidence in the “patriots”.
The core goal of this profound reform of the method for forming the district councils and their functions is to “restore order from chaos”, conform their operation with the original intention of the Basic Law, and enable the entire governance structure of Hong Kong to render effective and high-quality governance in the city, especially at the district level
Fourth, since the district council will “revert” to the essence and role of an advisory body or an auxiliary administrative organ, it will work in tandem with the HKSAR government to do a better job in regional administration and, under the latter’s leadership, deliver services to residents. In the future, the district councils will be chaired by the district officers of each district; the financial power of the district councils will be transferred back to the government; and a system for overseeing the performance of district councilors is to be established. All these are manifestations of the principle of “executive-led governance”. The relationship between the HKSAR government and the district councils from now on will be one of “the arm guiding the hand”. Because of the growing mutual trust between the two parties, it cannot be ruled out that the HKSAR government will be inclined and assured to allow the district councils to undertake more management and service tasks in the future so that the services and facilities in various districts can be dovetailed to the “tailor-made” reflection of the needs and aspirations of the residents.
Fifth, when the district council is no longer a platform for political struggle and a nest of the “anti-China and seditionist elements” in Hong Kong, the role of the district council as a bridge connecting the HKSAR government and the residents will also be strengthened. District councils can then better play the role of the intermediator between the government and the people, explaining the government’s policies to the district residents and feeding their views and concerns back to the government. This will help the HKSAR government to understand and feel the people’s conditions and opinions more accurately and empathetically, and prompt it to formulate policies and measures that are more conducive to the well-being of the people. This will help improve the administrative structure and performance of the government at the district level.
Sixth, when district councils are increasingly partnering themselves with the government in governance, the latter will have the incentive and needs to more effectively and efficiently deploy administrative agencies and allocate resources at the district level so as to bolster the government’s governance capability in the districts. The establishment of a district administration leadership committee headed by Chief Secretary for Administration Eric Chan Kwok-ki and a district administration special task force headed by Deputy Chief Secretary for Administration Warner Cheuk Wing-hing are related to this. It can be expected that in the future, the government will “decentralize” and distribute more district related work to the district-level administrative departments so that district administrators from various departments can tackle local problems more practically, ultimately bringing about a better division of labor between the “central” departments and their district branches. This will further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Hong Kong’s governance system, especially at the district and grassroots levels.
Finally, Hong Kong will be more capable of safeguarding national security after revamping the method for forming district councils. In fact, “safeguarding national security” is the paramount principle in this reform exercise. It is reflected in all aspects of it, especially in the establishment of the candidate qualification scrutiny mechanism and the introduction of the candidate nomination mechanism. In future, internal and external hostile forces will be completely excluded from the district councils, and they will no longer be a platform and channel for such forces to threaten national security by instigating political struggles and creating turmoil, but instead be a formidable combatant to fight against them.
In short, the reform of the method of forming the district councils and the redefinition of their functions are crucial to improving Hong Kong’s governance system and its performance under the principle of “one country, two systems”.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.