Hong Kong’s reform is entering a new phase. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the National Security Law for the HKSAR), promulgated in June last year, has installed the first line of defense for national security in Hong Kong; while the decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to improve Hong Kong’s electoral system through amendments to Annex I and Annex II of the Basic Law of the HKSAR in March will plug the loopholes in the existing electoral system to ensure the principle of patriots governing Hong Kong.
Still, there are more steps Hong Kong must take in its reform process, and the SAR government must prove with commitment as well as wisdom that it can do a good job, considering how challenging the internal and external politico-economic conditions are, moving forward.
Without question, Hong Kong’s political system needs an overhaul as soon as possible. Take a look back at the experiences of some typical (Western-style) democracies in the past decade or so, and one can easily understand why more and more people in those countries and regions no longer take the “democracy equals good governance” formula for granted. For example, the 2020 Democracy Perception Index contains some interesting if not ironic findings: On the question “My government usually acts in the interest of a small group of people in my country,” 52 percent of respondents from the US — “the most powerful democracy in the world” — agree, as compared with only 13 percent in China — which is a lot of things except democracy in the Western eye. It’s not hard at all to see which of the two governments “serves the people” better, in the opinion of their own people. That is why political system reform must be able to improve the chosen design of the system, so as to win the government more popular acceptance and support for good governance. Hong Kong’s biggest failure in constitutional development so far is not lack of universal suffrage but the absence of an efficient governance system. Soon we will be celebrating the 24th anniversary of the HKSAR, and yet people are still talking about “removing all the remnants of colonialism”, while all the deep-rooted structural problems born in the colonial era remain unresolved. Where do we start with formulating a long-term development strategy?
As an overall principle, I suggest the new governance system should be built with “governance commitment” at its core and consisting of two subsystems: a “technocrats system” and a “principal officials system”
Hong Kong’s governance system has long been built with the civil service system at its core. That system design, however, has recently been identified as a contributing factor to low administrative efficiency. To be fair, we cannot dismiss all our civil servants as “unprofessional”. Those who know a thing or two about the workings of the government are aware of the myriad procedural issues the civil servants deal with every day, and every one of those procedures is there for a reason. In that sense, most if not all civil servants who have been following those procedures all their careers qualify as “experienced professionals” in their own right. Question is: How useful if at all can those age-old “professions” be as Hong Kong’s system reform continues?
The biggest difference between “civil servants” and “political officers” is that the former only require “executing commitment”, while the latter must have “governing commitment”. With “executing commitment”, the emphasis is on a job well done that satisfies the boss with little if any hassle. With “political officers”, on the other hand, “governing commitment” means political accountability and making decisions in the best interest of the people so as to maintain the legitimacy of the powers vested in them.
It is now a common understanding among all social strata and ethnic groups in Hong Kong that reforms are long overdue. To pursue any reform, it must begin with the decision-makers in the government. In Hong Kong’s case, the first thing the team of principal officials (key political officers), led by the chief executive, need to accomplish is figuring out how to go beyond the existing “civil service system” and construct a better governance system on top of it. As an overall principle, I suggest the new governance system should be built with “governance commitment” at its core and consisting of two subsystems: a “technocrats system” and a “principal officials system”.
The “technocrat’s” role will be played by civil servants, who apply their professional training on the job with “executing commitment”. The “principal officials system”, meanwhile, will feature an administrative team with “governing commitment” and be accountable to Hong Kong residents as well as to the central government. These two systems may be connected with a “revolving door mechanism” so that aspiring “technocrats” will have opportunities to become “principal officials”, along with proper training for them to upgrade their “executing commitment” to “governing commitment”.
Even with the National Security Law for the HKSAR and an improved electoral system, Hong Kong will have no shortage of challenges ahead. So don’t believe it when someone says “The worst of times is now behind Hong Kong.” It would not be easy to separate “executing commitment” from “governing commitment”, but absolutely necessary for the system reform to advance according to the chosen design. Otherwise, it cannot be meaningful constitutional development and/or reform to begin with.
The author is senior research officer of the One Country Two Systems Research Institute.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.