This article forms part II of my intellectual dissection of the liberal paradigm: “The crisis of the amoral liberal constitutional paradigm and of freedom”. It deals with I) the disoriented amoral individual (or liberal egoism) as the core of the liberal constitutional paradigm; II) His worrying nature, and III) Amoral liberal individuals are morally arbitrary and cannot provide a consistent and sustainable constitutional standard to demarcate the world.
I The disoriented “liberal individual” is composed of amoral desires (“liberal egoism”)
Liberalism has emerged as the dominant paradigm after the Second World War. That dominance was preceded by at least four hundred years of intellectual and social efforts in the West, in extracting and shaping the concept of the individual from numerous historical, feudal, and church subjugations. Among these efforts, the powerful Hobbesian analysis of individual biological desires has probably prevailed over the new individual and provided the real core of modern desire-oriented liberalism. Anthony Arblaster has, in his The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (“RDWL”), reconstructed the foundation of individualism. He argues that the formation of the liberal individual was made possible by a combination of historical trends and ideas: A separation of the “moral man” from the neutral and factual world; the isolation of human beings from each other; the separated consciousness; self-possession[i], and the rise of modern science.
Releasing humans from medieval inequalities, but then the liberated men are left to the temptations of desire-oriented “freedoms and rights”
Main scholars such as Alan Ryan and Larry Siedentop, agree that Protestantism[1] contributed to the formation of the concept of person. But it is important to note that that contribution was focused on the “rejection of the assumption of natural inequality by cannon lawyers, theologians and philosophers.”[ii] (Siedentop, p336) The morality is that of rejecting natural inequalities and hatred, and embracing equality and love. Arblaster thinks that the distinction between facts and values plays a key role in “liberal moral theory” in that it provided for the “moral autonomy” of the individual (p.19). In the secularised form of Protestantism, it is “the inner voice of God speaking directly to him through his conscience” (RDWL, p17). While Protestantism might have left to the individual “conscience” to dictate how others should be treated, it is dubious to further suggest that Christianity, a duty- oriented faith, could have endorsed desire- oriented “freedom and human rights”.
Hobbesian “desires” ousting individual conscience
The liberation process not only removed external, oppressive subjugations, but also activated individual desires. Desires are by nature “anti – moral”. There was a “contest” between moral norms and amoral desires for the new individual. The result of this contest seems clear. While the moral, equality norm has helped to set the individual free from old shackles, it is not an attractive ingredient to the liberated individual.
The real dominant and effective force which permeates liberalism is human desires. “With the possible exception of Bentham, no writer brings out more clearly than Hobbes the central role played by desires in the liberal theory of human nature.” (Arblaster, p. 134) Some 370 years ago, Hobbes provided, in his Leviathan (1651), a penetrating analysis of amoral human desires, both their inevitability and terrifying powers in human affairs, or the “state of nature”[2]. These powerful “existential desires”, not being harnessed by Hobbes’ questionable Commonwealth, have unleashed sustained forces which set Western history on a wealth-prone, culturally dynamic, but also violent and expansionist trajectory.
The Hobbesian individual is composed of desires and aversion (Arblaster 133)[iii]. Persons are identifiable with their subjective and distinct desires. Desires have often been, dubiously, and perhaps naturally, equated with individual existence (a state of “ontological individualism”, Arblaster 134). Our desires signify our separate existence, as “sovereign existence”, and, quoting from Hobbes, “to have no Desire, is to be Dead”. (Leviathan, p 60)
Given the constant threats from these never-ending desires from each other, desires also embody fear and aggressiveness. Ryan notes “how important fear is in explaining the causes and character of the “war of all against all” in the state of nature….”[iv] (“MML”, p.159). So desires and fear are human “essence” which determines reality. This powerful linkage of desires, and fear, to our daily realities becomes the core of liberalism, which permeates liberal principles and the construction of institutions. Institutions are there to serve individual desires. Desires tend to be individually-based, or group-based, or tribe-based, but not ethically based.
II The worrying nature of this liberal individual: the “sovereign status” of his desires, and that he is ontologically subjective
Arblaster describes the sovereign status of desires in liberalism, in these terms[v]:
“Finally, in our rough sketch of the philosophical foundations of liberal individualism, we must enquire what resources are available to the individual to enable him to achieve the autonomy and self-sufficiency which feature within liberalism as both the natural and the ideal state of the single person. I think the answer to such an enquiry falls into two parts. First, the liberal conception of human nature sees human beings as driven actively from within by the natural energy of innate desires and appetites. And second, the individual is guided in the pursuit of the gratification of these desires and appetites by the crucial faculty of reason, which is in some degree, the universal possession of human beings. Let us consider first the liberal view of human desires.
The desires or appetites which animate the individual are not mere passive wishes, or faint aspirations of the ‘it would be nice if …’ type. They are powerful enough to set the individual off in pursuit of satisfaction. They are what make human beings active rather than passive, creatures in movement rather than at rest. This is particularly clear in Hobbes: ‘Life is selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire …’ [Leviathan, p 52], and ‘to have no Desire, is to be Dead … [Leviathan, p 60]’; but it is also a fundamental assumption in Hume and Bentham, and is, indeed, one of the commonplaces of the eighteenth century. The action and behavior of the individual is naturally inspired by passions, appetites and desires which are fundamentally selfish, in that the individual naturally seeks his or her own happiness, pleasure and gratification. Here is the source of the dynamics of human action.” (RDWL p.28)
(1) Desires are sole standards of “morality/judgment” of right or wrong, good or evil, true or false, and real or unreal: They are the inner force of diversity, and of polarisation.
Desires are not conducive to forming common rules, but are prone to generating isolated (and isolating)[4] standards of “right or wrong”, of “good or evil”, and even of “true or false” and “real or unreal”. Amoral desires are the ultimate standards of judgment: “And not only reason, but also ethics, are subordinated to the desires”. (a state of “ethical reductionism”, Arblaster 134) My desires are my freedom, my dignity, and my existence. Desires are primary. Ultimately, only what I feel real is the reality. Desires are justifiably selfish. When two desires interact, not one is higher than the other, which can often trigger scenarios of “might is right”.
Ryan elaborates the link between desires and judgment in his “On Politics”, pp. 427-432:
“Hobbes gives a strikingly subjective account of the nature of Good and Evil and of a vexed subject, the existence of an ultimate good, summum bonum. He famously observed that “whatsoever every man desireth, that for his part he called good”. Good is not the name of a quality of things or state of affairs. It is the name of our desiring whatever it is. What we dislike we call evil….” The reality is our wishes and fears; “calling good” is prior to “being good.” The things we want we call good, and happiness consists in getting what we want. …
…
The human body is in incessant motion; our desires are constantly changing, and with them the standard by which we judge our happiness and misery. What Hobbes is careful to call the “felicity of this life” – leaving unspoken but implicit throughout that we can form no clear idea of what the felicity of any other life may be like – consists in satisfying as many of these changeable desires as we can, one by one. There are “second order” desires – the desire that other desires should be satisfied, and the desire that other people's desires should be satisfied: that is what benevolence is. Among the secondary order desires, the desire for security is especially powerful. The traditional doctrine of the common good is silently demolished, although a nontraditional account of a very different common good replaces it. We do not naturally converge on any particular goal: there is nothing that pleases everyone, and nothing satisfies any individual forever. Once a desire is satisfied, another takes its place, and we begin the search to satisfy it. This is not to be deplored; nobody things it gluttony to eat lunch as well as breakfast. The felicity of the angels makes no sense to us, though we may hanker after whatever we suppose it to be.”[vi]
The subjective desires of each person, being “standards” unique to each, tend to polarise, making interpersonal interactions difficult and unsustainable, if not impossible.
(2) Desires are amoral
Desires are themselves amoral: they are not subject to judgment by higher moral standards. Arblaster observes that “[Desires] enjoy a kind of sovereign independence which places them outside the province of morality”. Niall Ferguson writes “In the eighteenth century the British Empire had been, at best, amoral. The Hanoverians had grabbed power in Asia, land in America and slaves in Africa….” (Empire, at p113). Ryan likewise thinks that Hobbes’s desires are amoral. He says, at page 436 of “On Politics”, under the heading of “The laws of Nature”:
“When competition, diffidence and vainglory drive us into conflict it is no wonder that Hobbes supposed that life in the state of nature would be “poore, solitary, nasty, brutish and short.” This does not impugn human nature, and our actions are not sinful. Unlike Machiavelli, who says bleakly that men are evil and will do all the evil they can, Hobbes thinks they are essentially innocent. They are frightened of sudden and violent death and must do whatever they can to avoid it. In the wrong conditions, that makes things worse rather than better. The sense in which Hobbes is an Augustinian about politics does not extend to sharing Augustine’s obsession with original sin.”
(3) Desires are treated as ultimate
Arblaster notes the axiomatic, or ultimate, nature of desires within liberalism:
“The idea of human desire acquires an exceptional strength within the liberal conception of human nature. For Hobbes, Hume and Bentham, they enjoy a kind of sovereign independence which places them outside the province of morality. Desires are essentially given and unalterable facts of human nature to which morality must accommodate itself….” (RDWL, p 28)
“Liberalism … adopts a strikingly uncritical and unquestioning attitude towards the desires. It seldom asks where those desires come from, or how they may have been formed. The complex processes and experiences through which a child is adapted and adapts itself to the demands and limitations of a particular culture and society – the whole process of socialization – is generally ignored by liberal theory. …Liberals remain suspicious of any more general attempt to discredit the reliability of expressed desires as indicators of basic aspirations. It is still axiomatic for liberalism that people do know, and can express, what they want and what is in their own interest. Any suggestion to the contrary is treated not only as non-empirical, but also as potentially elitist and anti-democratic….” (Arblaster, pp 29- 30)
For those who are other than committed liberals, desires are probably not innate, but can be nurtured, modified, and therefore open to manipulation through social and psychological interactions. Desires are functional or instrumental, but have been misconceived as existential and therefore ultimate. This misconception has likely contributed to the uncritical attitude towards human desires.
(4) Desire, or “right”, satisfaction implies that others are means not ends, and is immoral by Kantian standard
In the course of realising one’s egoistic desires as a separate entity, each would inevitably treat others as means not ends. To truly realize a person’s right (desire) of expression, it implies that he is “entitled” to have passers-by as his “audience”, and therefore he is “entitled” to do so in a crowded, public place, even many would regard that as obstructing their freedom of movement, or their rights to peace of mind. But treating other human beings as means to satisfying one’s desires is immoral, which is the antithesis of the Kantian categorical imperative of “treat others as ends, not means”. And when desires conflict, the conflict may be resolved by the relative might of those who hold the conflicting desires.
III Can this newly emerged amoral liberal individual (liberal egoism) be “moralised”, or otherwise regulated?
Hobbes sees terrifying consequences in this group of amoral, desire-driven individuals. He is anxious to avoid “that miserable condtion of Warre”. But the solution he offers, the absolute “Common – Wealth” (Leviathan, Chapter XVII, p.136) is unattractive and untenable. The devout Christian John Locke appeals to the “laws of nature” (Ryan, MML, p.234) and paints a rosy picture. But that only shifts the amorality problem to whether “laws of nature” really exist. Hobbes does not think that laws of nature (i.e., “Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy…doing to others, as wee would be done to”), which are contrary to human passions, can be enforced without the “terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed…” (Leviathan, p.136)
The moral efforts in liberating individuals do not necessarily make them moral. Many liberals tend to assume that this liberated individual must be inherently moral. But it seems apparent that, while the efforts of liberating the individual from inequality (e.g., those who challenged established inequalities) may well be moral, but the liberation processes and results are not inherently moral[vii]. The individual so liberated is not moral, in that his desires cannot equip him with common moral standards to judge right from wrong, good from evil, and so on.
Amoral individual tends to be immoral. Individual immorality is amplified, not removed by democracy. The democratic process merely purports to aggregate the voters’ amoral individual desires to become an “amoral collective desire”. The voting process is neutral, and cannot give the “collective desire” moral quality, i.e., it does not make the winning party or its policies morally justified.[viii] Such democratically endorsed amoral/immoral “public will”, which invariably serves the self -interest of that democracy, can pose crisis of existence for the interacting communities, and crisis of civilization for all.
In modern days, attempts to resolve the problem of amorality is often deceptively trivialised by the fact that liberalism has nevertheless generated many achievements worldwide[ix] (ignoring its numerous, accumulated side effects), and by the ease of re-labelling biological desires with value – laden terms, such as dignity, autonomy, freedom, or human rights. The negative consequences of desires which have worried Hobbes so profoundly are side-lined, largely by this verbal technique of re-labelling, to become the foundation of a dominant culture.
Such trivialisation can tempt even experienced officials and intellectuals into thinking that liberal individualism is a reliable and consistent constitutional guide to demarcate the world into “friends and enemies”: “…Together, we will demonstrate not only that democracies can still deliver for our people, but that democracy is essential to meeting the challenges of our time. We will strengthen and stand behind our allies, work with like-minded partners, and pool our collective strength to advance shared interests and deter common threats…” (“Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, March 2021, The White House) If the true cause of the decline of liberal democracy is not properly addressed, this strategy would likely do more harm than good to both “friends and enemies” alike.
Amoral egoistic desires are powerful and insidious. There are further worrying phenomena: they seem not only able to resist moral norms, but also able to shape our perceptual and thinking process in line of its desire nature, and trap our reflective capabilities. These shaping effects result in at least three disruptive tendencies: subjectivism; zero-sum interactions, and racial supremacy (and “liberal imperialism”). Amoral desires, when allied with these disruptive tendencies, are prone to drive humans into the abyss of deep division, conflict and bloodshed[x].
The writer is a Senior Counsel who joined the Hong Kong Legal Department (the Department of Justice after mid-1997) as a public prosecutor in the mid-80s, and stayed in public service for over 20 years. He maintains a deep interest in classical Chinese philosophy and Popperian critical rationalism. He has complied books on the philosophy of science and on legal topics, and given jurisprudential lectures at various tertiary institutions.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.